of the occasional absence of those characteristics."
2 The dangerous aspect of drug consumption, according to the parameters of an increasingly powerful international drug control regime, resided not directly in an individual's consumption habits or even the physiological action of the drug on a person's body, but rather the threat these bodies posed to the larger "society." As such, the definition inherently structured into the international drug control regime the power of cultural, racial, class, gender, national and other biases to influence the determination of what constituted a menace to the community -and what steps should be taken to eliminate it. In the aftermath of World War II, and in the context of a burgeoning Cold War, scientific, and seemingly "neutral" advice, became in many ways the discursive framework animating USdirected policing and development in the hemisphere. In the Andes, an effort to regulate the production, distribution and consumption of coca commodities -drug control -was embedded in a larger program of economic development, social transformation and public health promoted by the United States.
Healthy bodies and societies came to be defined in terms of their capacity to sustain a market hierarchically structured to privilege North American manufactured goods. Concepts like "addiction," and the regulation and policing such labels justified, were selectively deployed to transform the habits and lifestyles of people not fully invested in -indeed often in active political, cultural and social opposition to -the cultural and economic hegemony of the United States. In the context of US-Soviet Cold War rivalry, and the attendant American interest in expanding the capitalist marketplace, these projects took on a peculiar urgency. The extension of the drug control regime provides perspective on the era's "development economics," which scholars Montecinos and Markoff have argued "blossomed as the Western powers, especially the United States, sought to continue and extend the now-established tradition of state-run economic management, with an eye to warding off Third World revolution."
3 The seeming contradiction of a capitalist system dependent on mass production and mass consumption targeting over-consumption or "addiction," was reconciled through cultural narratives that stigmatized "traditional" practices and targeted indigenous peoples for re-engineering to encourage "healthy habits" that would facilitate their incorporation into the US-dominated economic order. As the US publication Natural History explained in 1947, "the coca habit is more universal among Andean Indians than the tobacco habit is among civilized people."
4 Implicit notions of cultural superiority profoundly shaped the scientific rationale behind the selective attack on coca leaf chewing and the process of designating legitimacy within the system out of which it emerged. Institutional and popular scientists' logic, including their awkward efforts to protect tobacco and alcohol from regulation while targeting coca leaves (despite the "occasional absence" of addictive characteristics), reflected the larger structures of power operative in the world in the postwar era, and in particular the determining influence of US capitalism.
This paper argues that drug control in the Andes -part of a broader US-led international, multilateral effort to promote "modernization" and "development" -justified an attack on the economic autonomy and cultural practices of indigenous communities to facilitate the structuring of a political economy that serviced US capital. Deploying a language of societal well-being grounded in western scientific explanations and tools -whether policing strategies, laboratory techniques, models of economic development or medical assessments -experts sought to direct the flow of coca products within an international commodities circuit (coca leaf, pharmaceutical grade cocaine and flavoring extracts). These efforts guided local coca leaf production towards a North American export market while focusing on "developing" the majority Andean indigenous population to produce and consume in such a way as to sustain the envisioned international economic order. Linking traditional uses to social dysfunction and criminality, the majority Aymara and Quechua populations in Bolivia and Peru were approached as objects of study and social engineering. At the same time, this effort depended on the collaboration of local elites, government officials and an increasingly visible array of experts deployed to guide "developing countries." The drug control regime sought to limit coca leaf production to internationally determined "legitimate uses" creating in the process an illicit/licit divide whose enforcement was guided by political and economic interests that increasingly were naturalized as facilitating the public good. Studying the mechanisms through which the United States fundamentally influenced the shape of the international coca economy at midcentury, reveals how drug control brought together policing and development discourses as it propelled the growth and expansion of US capitalism.
the CoCA CommodItIes CIrCuIt To understand the impact of these initiatives it is important to emphasize that international "drug control" is and has always been just that, a system of controls not prohibitions. Coca leaves and cocaine are themselves not illegal; they -and other substances that came to be regulated and culturally characterized as "dangerous drugs" -straddled the licit/illicit divide, their legal status being dependent on their circulation within the marketplace, on who it was that grew, manufactured, sold and consumed them. International drug control, a twentieth-century invention, operated through a system of licensing and taxation to monitor the international trade. It was a system that had been modeled on US domestic policy, and until mid-century one which had limited authority. 5 In the aftermath of World War II, the United States' unprecedented position of global dominance together with Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger's influential position on the newly constituted UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) ensured that international drug control took on a new character. At the CND's very first session, a reinvigorated focus on the international narcotics trade was paired with "the most urgent and important" effort to limit and control a particular sector of the drug commodity chain: the production of raw materials. 6 In practice this meant targeting the production of raw materials in the Southern Hemisphere, securing European and American manufacturing countries' access to these raw materials while locking developing countries into the bottom rungs of global economic production. And to this end, one of the first major initiatives pursued by the UN was a push to control the production of the coca leaf -the one of two designated categories of narcotics (the other being opium) that resided firmly in America's backyard.
Since the world supply of coca leaves came primarily from the Andean cordillera in Peru and Bolivia to be exported primarily to manufacturers in the United States, any effort to limit and control the international coca commodity circuit was fundamentally structured by power inequities within and between nation-states of the Western Hemisphere.
7 A marked shift in US global power augured new roles to be played by institutions of international governance. The UN became a vehicle for assessing and then controlling the volume of cultivation, trade, processing and the scale, scope and context of "legitimate" distribution of coca commodities. The US's unilateral drug control initiatives during the war, which linked control over the drug economy to the military, health and political needs of war-time national security, found a prominent place in a post-war/Cold War expansionist vision.
8 While the United Nations may have been viewed by some as a forum for moderating US power -as a site to assert national interests within a new international order -it was nevertheless structured by the convergence of US capitalism and the colonial legacy of Great Power diplomacy. The turn to control of the coca leaf, to limit production to internationally determined "legitimate uses," was part of a north-south global order where the industrial powers continued to lay claim to the raw materials of the "developing" world, often by means of direct social, economic and political intervention.
The majority of coca leaves in Peru and Bolivia were cultivated for domestic consumption, where the practice of chewing the leaf was prevalent among the majority Aymara and Quechua Indian communities. Almost all of the coca grown in Bolivia was consumed domestically, or exported regionally. Peru, on the other hand, was the primary cultivator of all coca leaf that made it onto the international market.
9 With the drug control regime now targeting "raw materials" and, in particular, all coca which did not make its way into the North American export market, Bolivia's position was particularly negligible. At mid-century, and it is still true today, virtually all coca leaves exported from Peru were imported by manufacturers in the United States. The U.S. dominated this market not only because of regional ties, but more importantly because of US narcotics law. The United States government allowed only the importation of raw materials; all controlled substances in domestic circulation (or for export) had to be manufactured within the country. The pharmaceutical manufacturers Merck & Co., Inc. and Maywood Chemical Works held exclusive government-issued licenses to import coca leaves. Merck imported the leaves for the purpose of manufacturing cocaine to be used by the phar-maceutical industry as a local anesthetic and for research. Maywood extracted cocaine from coca leaves in the process of manufacturing a "nonnarcotic flavoring extract," otherwise known as "Merchandise #5", a component of the famous soft drink Coca-Cola. 10 While today the illegal cocaine market's scale dwarfs quantities produced for the pharmaceutical industry, in the post-war period the reverse was true. The legal industry's production vastly exceeded quantities of illegal drugs seized while all drug production appeared minuscule besides the quantities of cocaine destroyed or sold to the pharmaceutical industry as a bi-product of processing the coca leaves for Coca-Cola. Even before Coca-Cola's international operations expanded during and after World War II, as early as 1931, Coca-Cola was using more than 200,000 pounds of coca leaves annually used to manufacture some 10,000 gallons of "nonnarcotic flavoring extract."
11 As laboratories worked their magic, these internationally derived commodities were re-packaged and sold as "national" American products, celebrated even as embodiments of the medical and entrepreneurial benefits of US capitalism.
12 mAnuFACturInG "leGItImACy" The centerpiece of these initial efforts to regulate the coca leaf would be the United Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf, a fact finding mission sent to the Andes in 1949. The Commission published its findings and recommendations in 1950, disseminating only the first of many official UN investigations and publications into the matter. The report's publication came at the end of three years of organizational effort, fieldwork and a considerable amount of debate both within and outside of the Commission, in the Andes and in the United States. These debates, and the various organizational structures and ties which framed both the issues at hand and the necessary "expert" qualifications for participation, provide a critical perspective on the parameters of development within the US sphere of influence in the mid-twentieth century.
In the context of US pressure and international attention on the coca commodity chain, the immediate pretext for the UN Commission's creation and field work emerged in an official petition from the Andes. Andean businessmen, government officials and scientists collaborated with the drug control apparatus at mid-century. They were motivated both by the economic and political advantages of aligning with the United States, as well as an interest in retaining a degree of control over national economic development.
13 Responding both to an increasingly acrimonious debate among Peruvian scientists as to the relative merits or dangers of customary Indian coca leaf chewing, and to the growing international pressure for Peru to enforce and maintain stricter control over their domestic and international coca production and trade, in April 1947 the Peruvian Government submitted a proposal to the Narcotics Commission of the United Nations to conduct a field survey on the coca leaf. Given the prominence of US power in the coca commodity circuit, and the CND's inaugural interest in limiting the production of raw materials in producing countries, Peru approached the United Nations in an attempt to retain a degree of influence over the parameters of the coca control apparatus that was already being implemented.
14 In a challenge to what many Peruvians and Bolivians believed was the hasty classification of the coca leaf as a dangerous drug, the Peruvian Representative, Dr. Jorge A. Lazarte, explained "his government's reason for making the request" noting the difficulty of handling the situation due to the scale of consumption, the fact that the coca shrub grew wild, and the "highly controversial" nature of the issue. He emphasized the need for further investigation into the physiological and pathological effects of this habit or to ascertaining whether it was necessary to suppress it. The habit had endured for many centuries and the Indian population which indulged in this practice appeared to be healthy and prosperous, capable of very hard work with little nourishment.
15
Peru's representative argued coca leaf chewing was a "habit" whose negative mental and physical effects had yet to be determined. Bringing together elite paternalism and an interest in Indian labor-value, he suggested coca enhanced the "Indian population's" capacity to perform "very hard work," something which might militate against prohibition. In fact, scientific investigations into Indian pathology and physiology would provide a common ground for proponents in the debate who all saw Indian labor productivity as a measure of coca's impact on societal health and prosperity, even if they drew different conclusions. The leadership of the UN CND endorsed the project while presuming coca leaf chewing's detrimental impact necessitated a focus on policing. The Chairman of the CND, Colonel C.H. L. Sharman, the Canadian Representative and close friend of the US representative, FBN Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, "suggested broadening the scope of the study" to include "the possibilities of limiting the production and controlling the distribution of coca leaves."
16 This latter point would in fact become the main objective of the UN commissioners dispatched to the Andes. Looking back on these efforts, the Secretary of the UN Economic and Social Council (and later director of the Narcotics Division), declared that contrary to the Peruvian representative's initial request, the Enquiry "was not really a technical assistance mission. It was a mission to persuade or encourage these Governments [of Peru and Bolivia] to change their policy by recognizing that the coca problem was a thing to be tackled, and gradually suppressed."
17
The Peruvian proposal, therefore, emerged from the UN in modified form. The original framework of public health and labor concerns was paired with an effort to control the scale and scope of the coca leaf economy. As the UN commission traveled through the Andes it did so under the leadership of an American pharmaceutical executive, backed by a number of experts in policing, pharmacology and nutrition. 18 The composition of the UN Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf reflected the dominant influence of US capitalism on drug control efforts at mid-century. In particular, it embodied the com-bined interests of the US government and pharmaceutical industry, as well as the international network of "experts" upon whom it relied for legitimization. Emblematically, as the UN planned its "Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf," Merck & Co., Inc. contacted the Federal Bureau of Narcotics anxious that inadequate coca leaf supplies might undermine the company's profits, which increasingly depended on expanding into foreign markets. The head of the FBN confidently predicted the outcome of the UN commission's efforts: "I believe that as soon as the United Nations Commission of Enquiry finishes with its study of the coca leaf chewing there will be a tremendous surplus, because the amounts chewed approximate twenty-five million pounds."
19 Thus the FBN depicted the effort to limit existing indigenous communities' access to the coca leaf, as a mechanism for securing ample supplies of raw material for US manufacturers seeking to expand their global market.
When word of the UN Commission reached Bolivia, the politically powerful organization of coca plantation owners in the Yungas, the Sociedad de Proprietarios de Yungas (SPY), suggested Bolivia participate to prevent the control apparatus from undermining their economic influence. Across the Andes small peasant farmers grew the majority of coca, yet landowning elites dominated the export market. The SPY sought to ensure "that Bolivian coca not be included in the catalog of narcotic drugs and that, consequently, no restrictions be established regarding its consumption, production and exportation." The SPY's interest in pursuing the industrialization of coca products led the Bolivian government to seek inclusion in the UN enquiry, mistakenly believing the UN's work might lead to the elimination of coca from the list of internationally controlled substances, opening up a new international market for Bolivian manufactured goods. 20 The head of the UN Narcotics Commission, Leon Steinig, revealed a different perspective when he appraised the Andean export economy in light of the pending field survey. "Bolivia" he declared, "was the only country exporting large amounts to other countries for consumption by addicts… all of the [coca] exported by Bolivia had gone to [Andean] countries where the habit of chewing coca leaves prevailed." Peru, on the other hand, was more favorably assessed, inasmuch as "half of the total [coca exported] went to the cocaine manufacturing countries and most of the remainder to countries manufacturing non-narcotic substances."
21 Thus in a context where international efforts sought to limit both Peru and Bolivia's participation within the international coca commodity circuit to the production of raw materials for export to manufacturers (primarily in the United States), Bolivia as a producer only of "addiction" did not figure into the "legitimate" market for the UN Commission at all.
The Bolivian government responded by accepting the technical assistance it believed would accompany the enquiry, while echoing Peru's invocation of health and labor concerns:
Coca leaf chewing is not a vice in Bolivia, and no biological defects have been observed amongst chewers… The loss of the coca plant would create a real prob-lem… since it is an indispensable element in the subsistence of the agricultural and mine workers.
22
Peruvian and Bolivian government officials contested the terms of their incorporation into the drug control regime by challenging whether coca should be regulated as a "vice" and instead emphasized both its potential to fuel national industrialization and its ongoing role in sustaining labor productivity in the fields and the mines. The UN Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf became a battleground for national elites over the terms of incorporation into international economic and control networks. Both Peru and Bolivia argued before the United Nations that coca might propel national economic development and modernization, and that further study was needed. These debates unfolded for more than two years before the United Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf traveled, in 1949, through Peru and Bolivia, visiting regions tied to the cultivation, distribution and consumption of the coca leaf.
polICInG "the CrIsIs" The impact of the UN initiative -and the drug control framework it grew out of and extended -was felt even before the Commissioners journeyed through the Andes and compiled their report. A division of labor was built into the hemispheric policing apparatus. The work of UN experts and scientists on the coca leaf "problem" unfolded in tandem with international police collaboration designed to "suppress" and "tackle" cocaine. Cocaine as a commodity -whose dangers, by the 1940s were less disputed than those of the coca leaf -was quickly regulated in the Andes through the collaboration of Peruvian and US authorities, even while representatives continued to debate the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with the raw material, the coca leaf, on the floor of the United Nations.
By the time the UN Commissioners arrived for their expedition in September 1949, the new President of the Military Junta in Peru, General Manuel A. Odría, had already invoked the work of the Commission and the international demand for drug control both to justify and explain the imperative behind a number of Supreme Decrees issued earlier that year. These decrees defined the illicit market specifically as the unregistered traffic in "cocaine" and introduced a paradigmatic shift in state-run drug control policy away from a question of public health towards a new punitive approach centered on aggressive policing and market regulation. Defining and policing the "illicit" was facilitated by the establishment of a national coca monopoly to control "the sowing, cultivation, and drying of coca, its distribution, consumption and exportation," and to limit coca's industrialization -its processing for medicinal purposes -to the government. 23 These initiatives were welcomed publicly and enthusiastically in the United States, particularly by FBN Commissioner Anslinger, who praised Odría's efforts in Time magazine. Collaboration between the FBN and the Peruvian police had in fact led to a much publicized cocaine trafficking bust, which along with the pending UN "enquiry," was used as public justification for the new harsher legislation introduced by the Peruvian government.
24 Not mentioning the FBN's involvement (perhaps so as not to inflame political currents opposed to US imperialism), 25 the military government nevertheless situated these initiatives within an international context. El Comercio, a popular Lima newspaper and media outlet for General Odría's government and the Lima social elite, reported that these decrees were passed because of the government's "desire to extirpate drug addiction from the country and avoid the trafficking of cocaine by unscrupulous individuals, Peruvians and foreigners, that have assaulted the national prestige."
26
While previously Peruvian officials had invoked national sovereignty to challenge international efforts to control the domestic coca leaf economy, now Odría evoked the nation's modernization and international prestige to justify consolidation of control over the domestic economy and the deeper integration of this economy into the international drug control apparatus. By instituting these decrees and taking aggressive action against "unscrupulous individuals," Odría was capitalizing on international calls for drug control to garner domestic and foreign support for the new military regime. As the Peruvian economy and social control apparatus were further integrated into a US-dominated hemispheric order, the licit/illicit divide became a powerful economic and political tool, which relied on the demonization of cocaine and "cocaine traffickers."
27
Political power accrued to those who embraced the drug regulatory regime. For example, when the founder and leader of the popular opposition party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Victór Raúl Haya de la Torre, sought political asylum in the Colombian embassy, General Odría argued the request should be denied on the grounds that he was a common criminal rather than political refugee. He based this charge on information gathered from his collaborations with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in relation to the recent bust of a cocaine trafficker with Peruvian connections in New York. 28 "Cocaine," then as now, was a fungible commodity. For Odría, the battle against a "cocaine trafficker" (and founder of the socialist APRISTA party) consolidated his domestic power while augmenting his international political capital with the United States.
29 Odría perhaps learned this not uncommon McCarthy-era tactic from the US Commissioner of Narcotics himself who regularly invoked the spectacle of the "communist dope-pusher" to advance his agenda. 30 More than simply currency in a play for US support, Odría traded in drug scandal domestically. The spectacle of prominent drug cocaine trafficking busts and investigations in the media helped to criminalize domestic political dissent while giving legitimacy to the coercive measures the military junta was using to consolidate its control. 31 The political manipulation of criminal enforcement was becoming an increasingly common tactic in the Andes (and, indeed in the world) as the drug control regime gained traction. It is worth noting that in the early 1960s Bolivian labor leader and Vice President Juan Lechín would be forced into quasi exile as historian Kenneth Lehman has argued, based on "trumped-up charges of cocaine trafficking."
32
The spectacle of the drug bust was deployed both as a political and economic weapon, since the Peruvian government selectively licensed cocaine manufacturers and pursued criminal investigations to prevent seepage into the newly "illicit" realm. It was through legislation and a series of spectacular criminal cases in the spring of 1949 that the line between licit and illicit cocaine was publicly delineated, throwing former legitimate manufacturers onto the wrong side of the law. In one such incident, El Comercio published the mug shots of fourteen men -all groomed and in business suits -who were accused of cocaine trafficking. The cocaine was manufactured at the factory of Andrés Avelino Soberón in Huánuco. Soberón, a licensed manufacturer, was accused of producing cocaine in excess of his government contracts. 33 The chief of police publicly attacked the "traffickers" for their luxurious lifestyles and their "ill-gotten wealth," airing a populist appeal to the masses as the new regime sought to legitimate its rule. 34 As the government consolidated its control, enforcing the new legislation, it literally created the illicit economy and numerous pharmacists, formerly legitimate manufacturers of cocaine, became embroiled in the "illicit" trade. This gave the government the power both to determine who got to participate in the legitimate coca-commodities trade, and to wield a powerful symbolic weapon attacking "criminality" in the struggle to consolidate political and economic control.
rAw mAterIAlIsm The logic of coca leaf control was embedded in debates about the land, life, labor and consumption habits of Andean Indians. While governments deployed law enforcement to establish a line between licit and illicit cocaine, regulating the coca leaf would prove more complicated. In many ways this reflected a much longer colonial and imperial history. Historian Kenneth Lehman has argued that the twin exploitation of "silver and Indians" drove Spanish colonial policy in the Andes and continued to characterize post-independence governments' structural exclusion of Indians from "national life."
35 This marked only the beginnings of an ongoing imperial encounter where local European-descended elites joined with foreign, and by the mid-twentieth century, primarily US based-interests to approach the native population as "vital resources of revenue." Much like the coca leaf was being cultivated as raw material to be reworked in North American pharmaceutical laboratories, so too were Indians approached as raw materials whose habits and lifestyles needed to be transformed for the national good. The UN regulatory effort explicitly defined coca's hazards in terms of the racial and economic status of its consumers: "Not all Indians are coca-leaf chewers, though the great majority are. Moreover, chewing is practised among the mestizos, although to a much smaller extent. The very few whites who chew coca leaf must be regarded as isolated cases, and not as a social problem."
The UN's focus on controlling the coca leaf (or "supply side" of the market) ensured that this aspect of international drug control constituted an intervention in local conflicts over the terms of national economic development and, in particular, the place of the "Indian" in modern society. At the raw materials end of the commodity chain, the coca leaf in the Andes had always been more than simply a sellable product or consumer good, people valued it as an object of ritual and respect for the earth, as currency and, in post-conquest times, as wage payment, something which sustained workers' stamina and even as the basis for a subsistence-farming, small-scale market economy somewhat autonomous from European control.
37 Centuries-long debate had swirled around Indian coca leaf consumption which until these UN initiatives was accepted as a necessary, if vexing, aspect of Indigenous labor control. 38 Neither national nor international elites particularly worried about transgressing Indian cultural traditions, yet there was considerable interest in maintaining control over the labor force by acknowledging both customary usage and the leaf's central role in the wage-labor economy. As late as 1940, the Bolivian government decreed that coca was "an article of prime necessity" and ordered its compulsory sale in mining and railway companies. 39 The UN commission, and the national and international experts with whom it consulted, successfully shifted the regulatory landscape to identify coca leaf chewing as an obstacle to national development.
The UN Commission recommended national governments implement policies for policing coca circuits not tied to the "legitimate" North American market -creating through legislative action what came to be called the "illicit drug trade." It also recommended that Andean governments set about eradicating the practice of chewing the coca leaf. It was undoubtedly more palatable for national elites to participate in international initiatives when the exploited Indigenous populations were identified as the source of the "social problem." Despite some resistance in Bolivia, the general tenets of drug control were accepted in the Andes. The Bolivian Government agreed that scientific investigations into chewing coca leaves constituted the appropriate mechanism for determining "if coca is a great tonic as it is considered to be among our indigenous masses, or a toxin that must be eliminated."
40 And in Peru, after establishing a national coca monopoly, the government began "to limit, for now, and eradicate in the future, this general custom, in defense of the indigenous population."
41
The "defense" of indigenous peoples through the eradication of age-old cultural practices depended upon the reformulation of these practices as hazardous not only to the Indian consumers but to the health and well-being of the larger society. Peruvian scientists' debates about the effects of coca on the Indian body and social development became a critical frame of reference for the UN Commission, which drew upon a scientific discourse to pressure for an economically-based system of limitations and controls. This focus was not merely an external imposition, but very much a product of local scientists' incorporation into a US-dominated drug research network. These scientists depended on private and public capital to finance their research and to sustain political support for their work. Both Dr. Carlos Monge, and Dr. Carlos Gutiérrez-Noriega, the two primary adversaries in the Peruvian debate, had studied and taught at US universities, and maintained ties with various North American institutions.
Monge drew upon his work as the Director of the Instituto de Biología Andina to defend Indian coca consumption as a natural, unharmful component of a high altitude environment inhabited by the racially specific "Andean man." This line of reasoning, grounded in the racial stratification of Andean society, relied on the idea that "the Andean man is a climactic-physiological variation of the human race"in order to question the notion whether coca leaf chewing reflected pathological behavior.
42 He leveled this argument as an Indigenista, paternalistically protecting the Indians from those who would disdain them as uncivilized or backwards. Nominated by the government to preside over the National Committee on Coca, an investigative body created in response to the UN initiative, Monge's views carried considerable weight. Monge's prominence in scientific and political circles in Peru both bolstered and was facilitated by his international connections. Interest and support for Monge's Institute of Andean Biology came primarily from US-owned mining companies, the U.S. Air force and livestock breeders of the central highlands who were all interested in maximizing (worker/soldier/animal) productivity at high altitudes. 43 Thus, a nexus of national and international medical, military and business interests facilitated the scientific research that became so central to debates about coca.
When the UN Commission arrived in Lima, Monge was on tour in the United States where he attended the Congress of Americanists, organized by the American Anthropological Association, and gave a presentation before UNESCO on "Physiological Anthropology of the Inhabitants of the Altiplanos of America." He returned to Peru in the midst of the UN visit to preside over the International Symposium on High Altitude Biology sponsored by Monge's own Institute, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Institution. The symposium was convened "to understand the new Andean biology and anthropology and the social and racial conduct of high-altitude man."
44
It attracted not only the UN Commissioners themselves who participated in a number of the sessions, but also an array of prominent US officials, including the chief of US Air Force Medicine, and the Directors of the US Naval Medical Research Center and Army Chemical Center.
45 Gutiérrez-Noriega, based at the Institute of Pharmacology and Therapeutics of the University of San Marcos, Lima, did his own tour of US scientific circles in 1949 lecturing at the Society of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics and at the University of Wisconsin. 46 His work turned to coca as an explanation for what he viewed as the uncivilized state of Andean Indian society, arguing, for example, that the "influence of the drug through many generations may have some importance as a creative factor in psychological disturbances and racial degeneration."
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Gutiérrez-Noriega's work fundamentally influenced the UN Commission's report and was well received in the United States, even being translated for publication in the popular magazine Scientific Monthly. Introduced by the editors as the "first sustained study of [Indian coca use] in English," Gutierrez Noriega argued coca leaf chewing was "drug" consumption: "In general, coca chewers present emotional dullness or apathy, indifference, lack of will power and low capacity for attention. They are mistrustful, shy, unsociable, and indecisive. In advanced stages many of them are vagabonds." This narration began by representing coca leaf chewing as a social dysfunction and flowed easily into its presentation as a veritable reflection of criminal proclivity, making people not just "unsociable," but "vagabonds." Such arguments blurred the line between cultural practice and racially based notions of cultural, or even genetic supremacy that increasingly were being articulated -in both the United States and the Andes -through the extension of a coercive penal apparatus.
48
The UN Report similarly invoked the specter of Indian degeneracy, linking the issue to economic development. The Commissioners determined, among other things, that coca chewing maintains "a constant state of malnutrition"; it produces, in some cases, "undesirable changes of an intellectual and moral character" and "certainly hinders the chewer's chances of obtaining a higher social standard." The report emphasized coca leaf consumption "reduces the economic yield of productive work, and therefore maintains a low economic standard of life," before going on to recommend that Peru and Bolivia institute policies geared toward its eventual eradication. 49 Linking coca chewing, "moral character" and economic growth, drug control built off a long colonial tradition of targeting Indians for cultural transformation, while providing a social and economic rather than the increasingly unacceptable racial essentialist rationale. At the second Inter-American Congress of Indian Affairs, held in Peru the same year as the UN Commission's visit, "the topic that raised more debate than any other related to the supposed physical degeneracy of the Indians," an idea dismissed overwhelmingly by the attendees, although the question of the harmfulness of coca "was left undecided."
50 At the moment when the notion of Indian racial degeneracy was becoming increasingly unpalatable, a new scientific language rooted in concepts like "addiction" supplanted more explicitly racialized debates, while re-embedding social, economic and racial hierarchies through discourses of criminality and social dysfunction. Thus, the UN Commission explained that it resisted the term racial degeneracy, which it linked to "the continuous outcry, heard all over Peru from the enemies of Coca chewing" and rather suggested that their "analysis did not lead to the result that the Indian is degenerating; rather that mainly as a result of malnutrition, these valuable people addict themselves to coca chewing."
51
Officials sought to define the parameters of legitimate drug consumption while creating a logical framework for policing its boundaries. Scientific investigation seemed to represent the ultimate authority for determining policies relating to the control, distribution and consumption of coca commodities. Peruvian scientists Monge and Gutiérrez-Noriega viewed each other as rivals, and indeed, their work approached the question of Indian coca leaf chewing from fundamentally different perspectives; Gutiérrez-Noriega attacked coca as generating Indian pathology whereas Monge saw it as a legitimate cultural practice of a unique, even super-human, species. Yet, there was considerable room for convergence between these two poles which relied on either debasing or idealizing the scientifically objectified "Indian." For international regulators as well, the "Indian" embodied the hazards and promise of Andean economic development. As drug control gained momentum, the physical and symbolic body of the Indian became the primary object of investigation for resolving the coca problem. Those people most directly connected to both the practice of chewing coca and the public response, Aymara and Quechua Indians, became objects of study rather than shapers of public policy.
This was forcefully apparent in a 1949 progress report from US Public Health Scientists' studying coca chewing under the auspices of the National Institute of Health (NIH). They constituted one of an array of missions in South America who collaborated with the UN, valorizing scientific "objectivity" and "truth" while denying the possibility that Indians' points of view mattered. The NIH's fieldwork at the Volcan Mines at Ticklio, Peru involved analyzing blood and urine samples obtained from Indian workers to track cocaine absorption in the body. They noted their findings were ongoing and inconclusive, yet one thing was clear: "The statements in regard to the coca leaf habit given by the workers are not reliable."
52 This silencing of the Indian voice was in sharp contrast to the centrality of the Indian body in studies of the coca "problem." Approaching Indians as components of the natural environment, researchers swooped down on mines, into the countryside, and utilized captive populations in penitentiaries and asylums to study the absorption of cocaine alkaloids in the body in relation to findings from IQ and other mental tests. An entire section of the Commission's report entitled, "The Chewing of Coca Leaf," was devoted to analyzing what happens to an Indian body after consuming coca leaves. In the process, the traditional practice of chewing coca leaves was reframed as a process of cocaine ingestion. 53 The end product of North American manufacturing technology was re-imported into South America as definitive proof of Andean raw materials' dangers; the coca leaf become cocaine. This scientific faith in finding answers by probing into blood, stomachs, digestive tracks and brains paralleled the easy objectification of Indians in popular literature, where Indians repeatedly were likened to animals, an eerie echo, perhaps, of the lab rats and dogs upon which scientists performed their first cocaine experiments. In a 1947 Inter-American article "The Curse of Coca," this fascination with the Indian body permeates the account. A 63-year-old man is described as walking "as far as a mule could go, simply on coca" and the coca fields, "look too steep to climb, but barefooted men and women scramble up the steps like mountain goats."
(re)produCtIve lAbor & publIC heAlth
Often it is said that the Indian constitutes an economic burden for these countries. This statement is unjust. The main source of labor for the mines and for agriculture is the Indian population. The only deficient factor is that because of his low standard of living the Indian is a very poor consumer.
Bolivian Ambassador Victor Andrade to Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1948 55 Arguments for coca eradication stigmatized Indian practices while proselytizing a model of "civilization" based on liberal visions of land ownership, hard work and consumer capitalism. 56 The UN observed the "concept of individual ownership is constantly spreading among the native landowning population" while lamenting that " [m] any Indians, however, possess no land, and work for others."
57 The attack on coca entailed the transformation of individual habits, as well as a general restructuring of the national economy (to secure the export market and stabilize the region for foreign investment).
58 Coca was a source of government revenue and a lynchpin of the informal market. Gutiérrez-Noriega estimated the "coca leaf [was] the single most important item of commerce in the Andes."
59 The Report of the Commission of Enquiry supported these claims, finding that "except in some cattle markets, business is on a small scale and generally limited to the exchange of products between the Indians. An exception is coca leaf; it is, as a rule, paid for in cash. In such markets coca leaf is sold by the Indian who grows his own crop."
60 Coca eradication thus entailed the radical transformation of the domestic cash economy including the elimination of many peoples' primary medium of exchange, subsistence and access to money, outside of the wage-labor sector. As one of an array of international development missions warned in 1951, "it must be constantly remembered that from one-half to two thirds of [Bolivia's] people still live practically outside the money economy on a more or less self-sustaining basis." 61 North American advisers had been at the helm of Peruvian and Bolivian "development" projects since World War II when war time collaboration prompted US advisors to study and recommend economic development programs that continued to influence government initiatives throughout the 1940s and 1950s. 62 The United States was the regions' primary export market and US public and private capital was the largest source of foreign investment in Peru and Bolivia at the time, particularly in the mining industry. 63 In this context, the regulation of the coca leaf provides perspective on the general orientation of US-directed Andean development. Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs spearheaded US involvement, pursuing Andean development through defining and institutionalizing "public health." Public health campaigns were launched specifically to transform "critical economic sectors."
64 Maintaining healthy mine workers and promoting market-oriented rather than subsistence-based agriculture was the focus of US initiatives. The American representative from the International Cooperation Agency (predecessor to US AID), John J. Bloomfield, who helped establish national public health programs in the 1940s in both Peru and Bolivia, focused these efforts on promoting "occupational" health in the major export industries.
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"Public health" was coming to be defined according to the international capitalist economic vision these experts embraced. Once the drug control regime regulated the hemispheric commodity chain, Andean countries who grew coca leaves exclusively for export (primarily to the US) might at end of the commodity chain be reincorporated as consumer markets for "American" goods. In fact dispensaries run by mining companies had been the largest purchasers and distributors of US pharmaceuticals, and employed a labor force that might easily be sold other commodities like Coca-Cola. 66 As a member of the UN Secretariat said, perhaps the fundamental vision underlying the commissioners' work had to do with the "main problem" of creating "a mass of consumers capable of supporting the new envisaged industrial and administrative developments."
67 This reworking of human raw material was to be pursued in the fields as well as the mines. A UN Technical Assistance Mission sent to the Andes in 1951 lauded the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf's conclusions and advised coca's eradication to cultivate export-oriented agriculture (agriculture, mostly subsistence-based, constituted 70% of the population's livelihood). Revealing once again, with no apparent irony, how cultural (and economic) biases shaped regulation, they recommended that "priority should be given to tea together with coffee" in a four-year pilot program to replace coca since, " [u] nder present conditions coca is the most profitable crop raised in Bolivia, and considerable economic dislocation would be caused if its production were suddenly to be discontinued."
68 Economic development had to be accompanied by social engineering. In particular, these experts identified "the fiesta and the habit of coca leaf chewing" as the source of "nonessential expenditure [which] is directly harmful to health and working efficiency," and recommended that "education on the evils of the present habits should be accompanied by an increased supply of household and other goods suitable for popular consumption."
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ConClusIon
Since there is an intimate bond between the individual and the community, it is also clear that the effects of coca-leaf chewing must be considered as socially and economically prejudicial to the nation."
UN Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf 70
The drug control regime targeted specific peoples' consumption habits as undermining the "nation." At this conjuncture ideas about policing and development converged and notions of social transformation depended on disci-plining alternative value systems and practices. In the realm of drug control, an ideology and political economy underwrote efforts to promote mass consumption of manufactured commodities while attacking the specter of mass addiction, or unregulated consumption. The creation of large-scale export and consumer markets required stigmatizing cultural habits that threatened their ascension. The fight against the "addict" and "addiction" became enshrined in international law and policy as the front lines of combat. By defining "addiction" as a threat not only to the individual, but also to the larger society, power hierarchies and cultural biases inherently structured visions of whom and what needed to be controlled. The UN discursive terrain re-framed an effort to impose an economic order as a social scientific "enquiry" that mapped easily onto the deeply embedded racial and class hierarchies which structured Andean society at mid-century. Drug control became almost exclusively a question of controlling Indian land, labor and consumption, while marginalizing Andean elites' own aspirations to produce coca-derived commodities for the world market.
These visions of economic development marginalized and stigmatized Andean peoples within the postwar economic order. Yet, there has been an ongoing history of indigenous resistance to the international drug control regime. Before Evo Morales, leader of the country's largest coca leaf growers' union, became the first Aymara president of Bolivia in January 2006, a US State Department report described him as an "illegal-coca agitator."
71 For Bolivian government officials and sympathetic observers in Washington D.C. such labels, in signifying criminality, sought to render the coca leaders' words and actions as being outside the realm of legitimate politics. 72 However, for the majority of Bolivians it carried a very different significance. In 2002 Morales' popularity forced an unexpected run-off election for President, and three years later he was elected into the office by an overwhelming majority. In August 2008, Morales once again emerged victorious in a national referendum on his administration.
Morales has directly challenged the language of criminality invoked to marginalize indigenous political organization and legitimize the "war on drugs" by highlighting that the system of controls surrounding coca is a question concerning Bolivia's economic development. "It's not possible," Morales has argued, "that the coca leaf can be legal for Coca Cola and not for us. It's hypocritical."
73 And so, the Bolivian government is claiming the right to industrialize coca -not only to continue to have a legal market for what gets described as "traditional uses" but, significantly, to have Bolivia be a legal participant within the international coca commodities marketplace and to be able to market coca-based products (teas, shampoos, soaps, toothpaste and more) internationally. Across the Andean region, leaders and indigenous communities are seeking leverage within that market by asserting the legitimacy of their participation within it.
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At mid-century regulating commodity flows was far more than an effort to corner an international market, it reflected the deep-seated political, cultural and social forces that legitimized and sustained the inequities of US-directed hemispheric development. The profits accrued from controlling the coca commodity circuit went to governments and political, intellectual and economic elites. The burdens of the system, as seen in the Andes, fell most heavily on Indian communities. As an international network of "experts" squared off, they grounded their recommendations in a determined application of the scientific method, in pilot economic projects and scientific analysis of indigenous bodies. The ensuing social stigmatization and criminalization of certain sites of production and consumption laid the foundation for a next half century of struggle to capitalize on the coca commodity circuit through control over both sides of the starkly delineated licit and illicit divide. "Report to the Economic and Social Council on the First Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs Held at Lake Success, New York, From 27 November to 13 December 1946," Commission on Narcotic Drugs, January 27, 1947, E/251, p. 11.
Before WWII coca leaf growing countries included: Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, the Netherlands Indies (Java, Indonesia), Formosa (Taiwan) and Japan. Peru has always been the largest grower, followed by Bolivia (which was surpassed by Colombia only in the late 1970s and 1980s, where cultivation relocated as a result of the heavily militarized war on drugs). At the time of the UN Commission, Peru and Bolivia were the most significant sites in South America, cultivation in Ecuador was considered "practically non-existent" and what was then only a negligible harvest in Colombia was already being reined in by the government (see United Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf. May 1950 [Fifth Year: Twelfth Session] Special Supplement No. 1, p. 105). As for the rest of the world, with the end of WWII, the Supreme Allied Command assumed control over Japan and Japanese occupied Formosa and Java, ensuring that what ever -if any -minimal production continued there was already firmly tied into the drug control apparatus. While coca leaf was grown primarily in Peru and Bolivia, chewing was practiced in regions throughout the Andes, and in some places in Brazil and Venezuela -however outside of Bolivia and Peru consumption was considered relatively insignificant (at least to the eyes of international drug controllers).
For more on World War II drug policy, see Suzanna Reiss, Policing for Profit: US Imperialism & the International Drug Economy, (PhD Diss., New York University, 2005) .
It seems occasionally when adequate supplies were not forthcoming from Peru, the US also turned to Bolivia, which thus, intermittently and on a small scale had an export market (see for example E/CN. "Para reprimir el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes," El Comercio, Lima, April 27, 1949, "Comisión que efectuará un estudio integral del problema de la coca," El Comercio, Lima, September 10, 1949, "Se Efectuará un estudio a fondo de la hoja de coca," El Diario, La Paz, November 2, 1949 . Marcial Rubio Correa, Legislación Peruana Sobre Drogas: 1920 -1993 "The White Goddess," Time, April 1949. Each decree in Peru was published in the main Lima daily newspaper, El Comercio and generally appeared in the midst of sensational newspaper coverage recounting drug busts and successful police actions against alleged cocaine traffickers. For instance, this orchestration and use of the media was apparent with the coverage of Decreto Ley 11005 of March 28. The full text of the decree was printed in the El Comercio a full month later, one day before the spectacular coverage of the capture of operatives in a cocaine trafficking ring -a bust which actually happened on April 13.
According to a contemporary "poll taken among the professional classes of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia" there was considerable hostility towards US "imperialism." See Carleton Beals "Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia," in Beals, Oliver, Brickell, and Inman, editors, What the South Americans Think of US (USA, Robert M. McBride & Company, 1945) , 10-11. During the 1940s political parties such as the MNR in Bolivia and APRA in Peru publicly embraced anti-"Yankee," anti-imperialist party platforms.
"Forma cómo se efectuó la pesquisa que permitió detener a los componentes de una banda traficantes de cocaína y la incautación de cuatro plantas de producción y refinería de este alcaloide en Trujillo," El Comercio, Lima, April 30, 1949. Drug control was just one part of a broader strengthening of the coercive powers of the state. As just another example of this invocation of national prestige to justify increased police powers, in March 1949, Odría introduced the death penalty for murderers and "traitors" with Decreto Ley 10976. (It is worth pointing out that if determined, as alleged, that the drug traffickers had "attacked the national prestige," their actions might have thus constituted a capital crime). He justified this legislation by suggesting that it was used "hoy por las naciones más civilizadas del mundo que aplican reitaradamente dicha pena como un instrumento inevitable para defender la supervivencia de la sociedad y del Estado." "El Junta Militar de Gobierno Establece la Pena de Muerte Para Los Asesinos y los Traidores de Patria," El Comercio, Lima, March 26, 1949 .
While Bolivia did not manufacture cocaine -minimizing the opportunity for such spectacular drug busts -nevertheless, the policing functions of the state here too were increasingly modeled on US policing tactics, and dependent on US military supplies and training. For example, the Bolivian Coronel de Carabineros Isaac Vincenti traveled to US for policing training: "en misión de estudios y perfeccionamiento policiarios" with the Washington Metropolitan police force and the FBI, and received "Socio Honorario de la Asociación de Policía del Distrito." Letter from Bolivian Ambassador to Señor Dr. Javier Paz Campero, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, January 7, 1949. Archivo de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, La Paz, Bolivia. Historian Kenneth Lehman has also described U.S. involvement in Andean police and military training.
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